寸头二姐 -
事故原因已侦破，请看下面报道：
法新社巴黎7月3日电（记者波尔瓦）据法国61空难事故调查组通报，法航空客A330失事案已成功告破。警方查明，此案是一起特大人为恐怖袭击事件，犯罪嫌疑人波利德里已当场死亡。
6月1日14时许， 一架载有228人的法航空客A330从巴西里约热内卢起飞不久在林西洋上空失事;机上228人全部遇难
事件发生后，法国迅速组成61空难调查组，全力以赴，开展了大量的搜索，取证，勘查检验、侦查实验和走访调查工作。经过大量艰苦细致的工作，现已认定61法航空难事件为一起人为恐怖袭击事件，经济舱A116号乘客波里德里是制造这起空难的犯罪嫌疑人。
法国事故调查机构BEA负责法航6.1空难调查的官员阿兰-布亚尔(Alain Bouillard)说，今年60岁的波里德里是法国科里嘉人，案发前暂住里约热内卢市。他在法国原籍嗜赌，长期不务正业。2007年到巴西后一直没有正 当职业，主要经济来源靠女儿波莉卡资助。
2009年，因为经济危机暴发，波莉卡被所在公司裁员失业在家，靠政府的救助生活，因此减少了给他的生活费，波里德里遂多次以自杀相威胁女儿给他汇钱以满 足他在巴西声色犬马的靡烂生活，并流露出悲观厌世的情绪。5月28日，其与女儿通话中表示“明天我就没有了”“跟别人死的方式不一样”等内容。6月19 日，其家人收到了波里德里案发前从巴西寄出的遗书。
经调查，6月1日14时14分左右，波里德里携带自制的雷电捕捉器从里约热内卢国际机场登机。机场工作人员莱尔纳多证实波时德里当时带了一件形状十 分奇怪的金属物品，经机场安检仪检查，不属于易燃易爆危险品，就没有在意，当时他还向这个法国老头说祝你一路顺风，法国老头回头还向他作了一个鬼脸，笑了 一下，笑得很诡谲异，但他当时并没有在意，谁知半个小时后就传来了飞机失踪的噩耗，波尔德里在飞机上启动雷电捕捉器吸引雷电击中飞机头部，机上人员全部遇 难。
据现场勘查显示，在波里德里所坐位置的地板上有雷电电击程度最为严重，座椅全部变形变黑，专家组认定为第一雷击区。通过现场勘验确认，雷击区的中心 区域只有波里德里的尸体，在其尸体旁提取到一件长约20公分的弯月形金属体。尸体倒地的姿势和朝向表明，雷击时波里德里面部超面，一丝狞笑的表情定格在其 脸上。
芝华塔尼欧的少年
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空客A332 全名空中客车A330-200,是由欧洲空中客车飞机制造的.安全记录很好.2009年6月1日，该航班一架使用空中客车A330-203客机（编号：F-GZCP），d
北境漫步 -
以下是BEA于2012年7月发布的报告结论部分的原文（因为机翻错误太多且无法避免，无法阅读，我个人又没时间一点一点翻，所以直接把原文写上去了）：
3.2 Causes of the Accident
The obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals during cruise was a phenomenon that was known but misunderstood by the aviation community at the time of the accident. From an operational perspective, the total loss of airspeed information that resulted from this was a failure that was classified in the safety model. After initial reactions that depend upon basic airmanship, it was expected that it would be rapidly diagnosed by pilots and managed where necessary by precautionary measures on the pitch attitude and the thrust, as indicated in the associated procedure.The occurrence of the failure in the context of flight in cruise completely surprised the pilots of flight AF 447. The apparent difficulties with aeroplane handling at high altitude in turbulence led to excessive handling inputs in roll and a sharp nose-up input by the PF. The destabilisation that resulted from the climbing flight path and the evolution in the pitch attitude and vertical speed was added to the erroneous airspeed indications and ECAM messages, which did not help with the diagnosis. The crew, progressively becoming de-structured, likely never understood that it was faced with a “simple” loss of three sources of airspeed information. In the minute that followed the autopilot disconnection, the failure of the attempts to understand the situation and the de-structuring of crew cooperation fed on each other until the total loss of cognitive control of the situation. The underlying behavioural hypotheses in classifying the loss of airspeed information as “major were not validated in the context of this accident. Confirmation of this classification thus supposes additional work on operational feedback that would enable improvements, where required, in crew training, the ergonomics of information supplied to them and the design of procedures.The aeroplane went into a sustained stall, signalled by the stall warning and strong buffet. Despite these persistent symptoms, the crew never understood that they were stalling and consequently never applied a recovery manoeuvre. The combination of the ergonomics of the warning design, the conditions in which airline pilots are trained and exposed to stalls during their professional training and the process of recurrent training does not generate the expected behaviour in any acceptable reliable way.In its current form, recognizing the stall warning, even associated with buffet, supposes that the crew accords a minimum level of “legitimacy” to it. This then supposes sufficient previous experience of stalls, a minimum of cognitive availability and understanding of the situation, knowledge of the aeroplane (and its protection modes) and its flight physics. An examination of the current training for airline pilots does not, in general, provide convincing indications of the building and maintenance of the associated skills. More generally, the double failure of the planned procedural responses shows the limits of the current safety model. When crew action is expected, it is always supposed that they will be capable of initial control of the flight path and of a rapid diagnosis that will allow them to identify the correct entry in the dictionary of procedures. A crew can be faced with an unexpected situation leading to a momentary but profound loss of comprehension. If, in this case, the supposed capacity for initial mastery and then diagnosis is lost, the safety model is then in “common failure mode”. During this event, the initial inability to master the flight path also made it impossible to understand the situation and to access the planned solution.
Thus, the accident resulted from the following succession of events:
Temporary inconsistency between the airspeed measurements, likely following the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals that, in particular, caused the autopilot disconnection and the reconfiguration to alternate law;
Inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path;
The lack of any link by the crew between the loss of indicated speeds called out and the appropriate procedure;
The late identification by the PNF of the deviation from the flight path and the insufficient correction applied by the PF;
The crew not identifying the approach to stall, their lack of immediate response and the exit from the flight envelope;
The crew‘s failure to diagnose the stall situation and consequently a lack of inputs that would have made it possible to recover from it.
These events can be explained by a combination of the following factors:
The feedback mechanisms on the part of all those involved that made it impossible:
To identify the repeated non-application of the loss of airspeed information procedure and to remedy this,
To ensure that the risk model for crews in cruise included icing of the Pitot probes and its consequences;
The absence of any training, at high altitude, in manual aeroplane handling and in the procedure for ”Vol avec IAS douteuse”;
Task-sharing that was weakened by:
Incomprehension of the situation when the autopilot disconnection occurred, Poor management of the startle effect that generated a highly charged emotional factor for the two copilots;
The lack of a clear display in the cockpit of the airspeed inconsistencies identified by the computers;
The crew not taking into account the stall warning, which could have been due to: A failure to identify the aural warning, due to low exposure time in training to stall phenomena, stall warnings and buffet,The appearance at the beginning of the event of transient warnings that could be considered as spurious,The absence of any visual information to confirm the approach-to-stall after the loss of the limit speeds,The possible confusion with an overspeed situation in which buffet is also considered as a symptom,Flight Director indications that may led the crew to believe that their actions were appropriate, even though they were not,The difficulty in recognizing and understanding the implications of a reconfiguration in alternate law with no angle of attack protectice